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Abstract
This article examines Official Development Assistance (ODA) policymaking in Japan and 
South Korea and identifies what conditions resulted in commonalities and differences in the 
incorporation of poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) into ODA 
policy in Japan and South Korea. For this, this article analyzes policymakers and stakeholders’ 
policy locations, measured by the distance between their preferences and poverty reduction and 
degrees of involvement in ODA policymaking. An analysis finds that bureaucratic organizations 
and presidents have led Japan and South Korea’s ODA policymaking, respectively; this provided 
South Korea more flexibility than Japan to incorporate poverty reduction into ODA policy. 
However, South Korean presidents’ wide policy preferences lessened the possibility of policy 
change concerning MDGs, and poverty reduction occupies only part of the overall ODA policy 
in South Korea, just as in Japan. The article argues that discerning not only policymaking 
systems—i.e., who decides ODA policy—but also policymakers’ preferences is essential for a 
better understanding of the commonalities and differences between Japan and South Korea’s 
ODA.
Keywords: Japan, South Korea, ODA policymaking, poverty reduction, policymaker’s preference
1. Introduction
In providing Official Development Assistance (ODA), Japan and South Korea share several 
characteristics deviating from other (Western) donors. Both Japan and South Korea have 
preferred loans over grants as the main type of bilateral aid, placed higher priority on 
constructing economic infrastructure rather than on assisting the social sector, and concentrated 
aid in the Asian region (Kim and Seddon 2005; Kang, Lee, and Park 2011). Kang, Lee, and Park 
(2011) found that among Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, only Japanese and 
South Korean ODA increases bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. These researchers 
noted that South Korea seems to have “followed the past path of Japan in foreign aid” (2011: 
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26). However, Kim (2016) observed that since joining the DAC, South Korea has more positively 
responded to aid norms and rules than Japan, and South Korea’s ODA policy and aid allocation 
have partially aligned with those of Western donors. How have Japan and South Korea 
incorporated poverty reduction and the achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
into ODA policy? How similar or different are their ODA policy for poverty reduction? What 
conditions in Japan and South Korea have resulted in the commonalities and differences?
To answer the question, this article examines ODA policymaking in Japan and South 
Korea and analyzes policymakers and stakeholders’ policy locations, measured by distance 
between their preferences and poverty reduction and degrees of ODA policymaking 
involvement. In particular, this article focuses on Japan’s creation and revision of the ODA 
Charter and on South Korea’s enactment of the Framework Act on International Development 
Cooperation (the Framework Act).
Section 2 provides reasons for comparing ODA policymaking in Japan and South Korea, 
and reviews the literature. Section 2 also introduces the article’s analytical framework. Sections 
3 and 4 examine the incorporation of poverty reduction and MDGs into ODA policy in Japan 
and South Korea, respectively. Section 5 analyzes what conditions in ODA policymaking 
resulted in commonalities or differences in the incorporation of poverty reduction into ODA 
policy in Japan and South Korea. The conclusion summarizes findings.
2. Literature Review
What factors resulted in commonalities or differences between Japan and South Korea’s 
ODA? According to Kondoh (2012), the “Japan factor”—i.e., Korea’s experience of receiving aid 
from Japan and learning, from Japan’s implementation methods, both economic development 
strategies and practical knowledge about giving aid—influenced Korea’s ODA policymaking 
and brought about similarities in the two donor countries’ manner of providing ODA. Indeed, 
the South Korean government modeled its aid structure after that of Japan, perhaps accounting 
for the similarities.
Considering system-level factors, however, that South Korea shares several distinctive 
features of Japan’s ODA is somewhat ironic. On the one hand, this is because, as a middle 
power in the world system, South Korea has a stronger motive for following established aid 
ideas, rules, and standards than does Japan, as a regional great power. Indeed, South Korea has 
been strengthening its contributions in specific niche areas, such as United Nations（UN） 
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peacekeeping operations, in pursuit of strong middle-power status (Ko 2010). On the other 
hand, it is also true that, as a founding DAC member country, Japan has had more time than 
South Korea to align its ODA policy and performance with those of Western donor countries, 
incorporating aid ideas, rules, and standards. In the 1990s, Japan led the international 
development community as a top donor. System-level factors highlight differences in policy 
outcomes between Japanese and South Korean ODA.
Hasegawa (1975), Rix (1980), and Orr (1990) observed that, by attempting to reflect several 
ministries’ interests, Japan’s ODA policymaking results in a complexity and indistinctness of 
overarching goals. Katada (2002) indicated that the two-track aid approach—mercantilism by 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and 
humanitarianism by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)—has led to inconsistencies in 
Japan’s ODA policy goals1）.
As for South Korea’s ODA, on the one hand, practitioners and scholars alike have 
increasingly recognized that the dual administration of aid by the Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance (MOSF) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) has led to lack of 
policy coherence. These similar conditions at the unit level suggest a high possibility of common 
responses to incorporating poverty reduction into ODA policy in the two donor countries. On 
the other hand, Kim (2013) argued that South Korea’s ODA objectives have been guided by 
each president’s foreign policy, resulting in some changes in aid distribution by region, 
especially aid to Africa.
Although these previous studies have separately investigated Japan and South Korea’s 
ODA policymaking, conditions giving rise to commonalities and differences between Japan and 
South Korea’s ODA remain somewhat puzzling owing to the lack of comparative studies.
Lancaster (2007) argued that studying a certain donor’s domestic politics is essential for 
understanding why that donor provides aid. According to her,
Foreign aid constitutes a public expenditure of significant size, repeated year after 
year. As such, it is periodically reviewed (and often influenced) by a variety of 
elements within the executive and legislative branches of aid-giving governments. 
Further, it is frequently the subject of debate by the public as well as criticism, 
attack, and pressures from organized groups—representing both public and private 
interests—in donor countries. All of these groups can and often do influence the 
purposes of aid. (2007: 4)
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As Lancaster indicated, multiple policymakers and stakeholders decide ODA policy, and 
each has policy preferences. This paper divides them into three categories: political branches, 
bureaucratic organizations, and others including implementation agencies and private 
organizations (international cooperation NGOs and private companies). Sections 3 and 4 
examine these players’ policy locations, measuring how close or far a certain player’s preference 
is to poverty reduction and how strong or weak that player’s involvement in ODA policymaking 
is. Section 5 analyzes the influence of two independent variables—the distance between 
policymakers and stakeholders’ policy preferences and poverty reduction and their degree of 
involvement in policymaking—on the dependent variable—incorporation of poverty reduction 
into ODA policy—in Japan and South Korea. In addition, poverty reduction as a major aid 
agenda reemerged in the 1990s at several UN conferences. MDGs are a super-norm 
incorporating carefully structured sets of interrelated norms on poverty reduction (Fukuda-
Parr and Hulme 2009: 30).
3. ODA Policymakers and Stakeholders in Japan
3.1. Political branch
Except for politically sensitive issues, such as scandals that capture the public spotlight, 
legislative players’ involvement and interests in Japan’s ODA policymaking are sporadic and 
limited (Orr 1990: 21–25). And, although the Japanese Diet passes an ODA budget resolution, 
the aid program’s details are left to the administration (Nakano and Asaumi 2000: 280–281).
The ODA Charter, which indicates the Japanese ODA policy’s overarching goals, was 
adopted in 1992, as a Cabinet decision. In 2003, the Japanese government revised the Charter, 
according to several changes in international and domestic conditions. One notable revision 
was the adoption of human security as an overarching perspective. Since then, with support 
for developing countries’ self-help and an aid approach for poverty reduction through economic 
growth, human security has consisted of characteristics of the Japanese ODA (MOFA 2015a: 
15).
Such adaptation evidences that Japan is attempting to incorporate poverty reduction 
norms into its ODA policy (Lancaster 2010: 34). At the same time, adaptation reflects the 
Koizumi administration’s strong involvement in ODA policymaking. With other major powers, 
the Koizumi administration positively participated in reconstruction efforts in Iraq, dispatching 
Self-Defense Force troops. Adopting the concept of human security for ODA policy can be 
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evaluated as an attempt to legitimize military involvement in Iraq by stressing that the activity 
is responsible behavior for securing Iraqis against want and fear. The increase in the 2005 
ODA budget illustrates that the Cabinet’s political preference affected Japanese ODA behavior 
(Leheny and Warren 2010: 12–20).
The New Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government, which came into power in 2009, 
reviewed Japan’s basic ODA policy in 2010 and showed its commitment to the achievement of 
MDGs, emphasizing them as one of three priority issues in ODA policy (MOFA 2010). However, 
the DPJ government excluded the bureaucracy from policymaking, and this resulted in 
dysfunctional government (Shinoda 2013). In addition, the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami 
disaster placed additional strains on Japan’s fiscal situation, and ODA budget reduction has 
continued since the DPJ’s rise to power.
In 2015, the second Abe administration revised the ODA Charter and changed its title to 
the Development Cooperation Charter, adding notable changes based on the administration’s 
two major policies. One administrative policy was the Japan Revitalization Strategy, in which 
the Japanese government redefined ODA as a measure to support Japanese companies in 
expanding the export of its infrastructure, such as high-speed trains and airports (Prime 
Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2013: 131–132). For this, the government eased the target 
countries’ income condition for loan aid in 2013, to countries with greater Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita than middle-income countries, for which the figure was $4,126 (MOFA 
2013). The new Charter stated the importance of public–private partnerships as not only “to 
support economic development of developing countries more vigorously and effectively” 
(MOFA 2015b: 13) but also “to enable such development to lead to robust growth of the 
Japanese economy” (MOFA 2015b: 13). Indeed, in December 2015, India formed an agreement 
with the Japanese government to adopt the Shinkansen system for its high-speed train project 
from Mumbai to Ahmedabad. Of 1.8 trillion yen, the total cost of the project, the Japanese 
government will provide 1.4 trillion yen as loan aid.
Another policy is national security strategy. Under the slogan “Proactive Contributor to 
Peace,” the Abe administration located ODA as a non-military tool for contributing to the 
promotion of peace—i.e., soft power—thus expanding the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)’s role as 
a hard power (Sato 2014). The new Charter stated that the objectives of Japan’s ODA are to 
“serve as a catalyst for mobilizing a wide range of resources in cooperation with various funds 
and actors and, by extension, as an engine for various activities aimed at securing peace, 
stability, and prosperity of the international community” (MOFA 2015b: 4). To meet these 
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objectives, the government established the promotion of human security as a basic policy but 
also allowed aid in which “the armed forces or members of the armed forces in recipient 
countries are involved in development cooperation for non-military purposes such as public 
welfare or disaster-relief purposes” (MOFA 2015b: 10–11). Since 2013, Japan has committed to 
aid programs for the provision of vessels and equipment for maritime security with the 
Philippines and Vietnam, where political tension is rising in South China Sea territorial disputes 
with China. In Japan, however, three ministries—MOFA, MOF, and METI—have led ODA 
policymaking, although another 10 ministries also receive part of the ODA budget and 
implement technical cooperation projects.
3.2. Bureaucratic organizations
Japan’s bilateral aid is divided into grant aid, technical cooperation, and loan aid. MOFA 
administers grant aid and manages approximately two-thirds of ODA with the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA). MOFA also plays the core role of interagency 
coordination and formulates ODA policies (OECD 2010: 53). MOFA emphasizes diplomatic 
interests and supports untied aid and increased ODA volume. MOFA has claimed to expand 
ODA volume for achieving MDGs, as noted below.
On the other hand, loans are determined in consultation with MOF and METI (Goto 2005: 
14–15). METI seeks to engage Japanese industries in loan-based aid projects (Nakao 2005: 23). 
It promotes economic development in developing countries as a means of securing import 
markets for major raw materials and for expanding exports (MITI 1958: 22). METI’s policy 
location has not changed following the adoption of MDGs2）. One distinctive characteristic of 
Japanese aid is that loan aid supporting economic development in recipient countries by 
constructing economic infrastructure has been a pillar of its ODA system, although grants 
administered by MOFA placed a higher priority on Basic Human Needs (BHN) and global 
issues.
MOF, which places highest priority on fiscal security, considers economic rationality, the 
recipient’s ability to repay the loan, and international financing when it participates in 
consultation (Nakao 2005: 23). Japan has cut the ODA budget since 1997, owing to its budget 
deficit. However, a chief of MOFA’s International Cooperation Bureau criticized this ODA 
budget reduction (Kitera 2008: 41), and MOFA has recently been requesting an ODA budget 
increase every year. However, MOF considers ODA volume at an already high level and 
proposes to improve ODA projects’ efficiency (Sato 2008). In 2014, Japan’s ODA budget was 
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550 billion yen, cut by half from 1.16 trillion yen in 1997. Budget constraints resulted in further 
enlargement of loan aid’s role within Japan’s ODA. Loan aid has the benefit of imposing a 
lesser fiscal burden because it has various financial sources and requires repayment3）. 
The 1992 ODA Charter reflected those bureaucratic policy preferences (Shimomura et al. 
1999: 96). The bureaucracy, including MOFA and other related ministries, rushed to formulate 
ODA policy to defend their territory from the legislative branch’s influence (Hashimoto 1999: 
358). On the other hand, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration then in office 
wanted to have an appealing policy in place just before the House of Councillors election, and 
MOFA did not want to lose flexibility in foreign policy as a result of legislation. The policy was 
thus adopted in the form of a Cabinet decision, not legislation, to satisfy the preferences of both 
actors: the LDP administration and MOFA (Shimomura et al. 1999: 67–96).
3.3. Implementation agencies, NGOs, and private enterprises
In Japan, two implementation agencies, the JICA and the Japan Bank of International 
Cooperation (JBIC), have accumulated information through studies and research activities; 
these two agencies relate to ODA policymaking by acting like a think tank4）. In 2008, the “new 
JICA,” established by merging the implementation of loan aid by JBIC and grant aid by MOFA 
and thereby integrating all types of aid implementation in one place, was accomplished. JICA’s 
functions include verifying legal contracts, disbursement, and monitoring and evaluation, all of 
which were previously MOFA’s responsibility. JICA can provide information for policymaking, 
as noted above, and its recommendations are often incorporated into MOFA policies (OECD 
2010: 55). With the leadership of Sadako Ogata, a former president of JICA, integration gave 
JICA a stronger voice in development discourse in Japan (Lancaster 2010: 38). However, 
MOFA remains involved in approving JICA projects to ensure consideration of diplomatic 
impact and public accountability as well as to assess recipients’ needs and potential 
socioeconomic impact. For loans, approvals by MOFA and MOF are needed (OECD 2010: 55).
International cooperation NGOs constitute an important ODA stakeholder in Japan. NGOs 
have proposed shifting ODA projects from the construction of infrastructure toward soft 
projects at the grass-roots level, but their power to effect change in Japan’s ODA policy has 
been limited (Hirata 1998: 329–331). In recent years, however, the number of NGOs and their 
access to government is increasing, and there exists the possibility that advocacy by NGOs 
might bring about policy change focusing on poverty reduction (Lancaster 2010: 50–51).
The private sector is another significant stakeholder in Japanese ODA. Indeed, Japanese 
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private enterprises’ monopoly in the procurement system related to aid projects has been a 
basis for criticism of its ODA. In both ODA policymaking and practice, Japanese companies 
doing business overseas have played an important role (Orr 1990: 61; Kato 1998: 201–202). 
Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation) has proposed policies and recently announced 
several suggestions for public–private partnerships, such as establishing a framework for 
regular dialogue and institutionalizing project formulation processes involving proposals by 
private companies (Minamishima 2008). The government accepted these suggestions and 
decided to adopt aid projects proposed by Japanese enterprises that had been banned because 
Japan had provided ODA based on recipient governments’ requests reflecting their own 
development needs (MOFA 2008). Significantly, METI has led the enhancement of relations 
between ODA and the private sector since Japan’s ODA began, and it has continued to 
support permitting Japanese enterprises to propose loan aid projects5）.
4. ODA Policymakers and Stakeholders in South Korea
4.1. Political branch
The Framework Act was achieved in 2010, promoted by the Lee Myung-bak administration6）. 
With the slogan “Global Korea,” President Lee Myung-bak introduced Kiyeo Oegyo (contribution 
diplomacy) as an instrument of comprehensive and pragmatic foreign policy. The Lee administration 
emphasized ODA’s increase as a major means of contribution diplomacy, along with participation 
in UN peacekeeping operations. In a policy paper published in 2009, the administration stated that 
the South Korean government would “broaden collaborative efforts with the international 
community to help achieve the targets set forth in the UN’s MDGs and support the poorest 
countries and the world’s marginalized people” (Blue House 2009: 30). However, the paper also 
mentioned that the government “hopes to harness our (Korean) ODA program to strengthen 
economic cooperation with developing countries in a way that augments opportunities for Korean 
companies and for accessing energy and natural resources” (Blue House 2009: 30). ODA is a means 
of “contribution diplomacy” that allows Korea better to uphold its long-term and comprehensive 
national interests like peace, economic advancement, and improvement of status in international 
society (Blue House 2009: 27; Kang 2008: 1–2).
Since the 1990s, in fact, South Korean presidents have had two foreign policy goals in 
common: one is aggressive economic diplomacy to expand markets and secure natural 
resources. Kim and Oh (2012) proved that South Korea prefers to allocate aid to higher-income 
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countries with higher growth rates, in order to pursue its national economic interests. The 
other goal is to become a developed country, with awareness that Korea, as a newly 
industrializing country, has responsibility for a role in solving the North–South problem. Kiyeo 
Oegyo (contribution diplomacy) in the Lee Myung-bak administration, Segyehwa (globalization) 
policy in the Kim Young-sam administration, Seonjin Oegyo (advanced diplomacy) in the Roh 
Moo-hyun administration, and Shinroe Oegyo (trust-based diplomacy) in the Park Geun-hye 
administration are all foreign policies reflecting this goal (Kim 2016: 64).
Basic principles and objectives of South Korea’s ODA in the Framework Act reflect these 
dual (developmental and commercial) policy goals. For example, Article 3 prescribes that the 
central purpose of South Korea’s international development cooperation is not only “to reduce 
poverty, improve the human rights of women, children, and handicapped people, achieve 
gender equality, realize sustainable development and humanitarianism” (National Assembly of 
South Korea 2014) but also “to enhance economic cooperative relations with partner countries 
and pursue the peace and prosperity of international society” (National Assembly of South 
Korea 2014).
As in Japan, the unicameral National Assembly in South Korea had been uninterested in 
and had very limited influence on ODA policy. Although the National Assembly has power to 
control ODA policy through budgetary discussions with MOFAT and other ministries, the 
assembly did not review materials describing diplomatic strategy by country or details of 
foreign policy, nor did it have independent committees for this purpose (Kim and Yu 2008: 
153–154).
With the ODA budget’s recent expansion, led by the executive branch, the National 
Assembly has become involved in ODA policymaking. In 2013, for example, legislators initiated 
an amendment of the Framework Act and added “the improvement of the human rights of 
handicapped people” into its basic principles. In addition, the National Assembly has been 
holding seminars and meetings to discuss South Korea’s ODA quality and policy coherence. 
Attendants share a common awareness that South Korean ODA needs to be reformed to 
incorporate international standards and rules7）. 
4.2. Bureaucratic organizations
As the Framework Act stipulates, South Korea has dual aid administration, consisting of 
MOFAT and MOSF, although more than 30 ministries, agencies, and municipalities have ODA 
budgets and implement ODA projects. MOFAT is responsible for grants, and the Korea 
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International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) administers their implementation. MOFAT 
emphasizes humanitarianism and ODA’s role as a foreign policy tool. Therefore, grants are 
provided for poverty reduction and recipient countries’ sustainable growth, with achievement 
of MDGs as a top priority (MOSF and MOFAT 2010: 35), as well as for diplomatic considerations 
to bolster Korea’s national interests (MOSF and MOFAT 2010: 38).
As in Japan, loan aid in South Korea is a major bilateral aid type; MOSF controls it, and 
the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) of the Export-Import Bank of Korea 
(Korea Eximbank) conducts the implementation. MOSF insists that national economic interests 
should be considered in formulating ODA policy (National Assembly Secretariat 2007: 19, 25) 
and is interested in securing ODA project contracts for South Korean companies. So, as not to 
reduce procurement opportunities for Korean companies, the ministry proposed a plan for 
untied aid several years ago, but it limited the untying to sectors in which Korean companies 
are competitive (MOSF and MOFAT 2010: 12). South Korea’s loan aid aims at establishing 
friendly economic relations with recipients through improving developing countries’ capacity 
for national and private-sector economic growth (MOSF and MOFAT 2010: 4) and prefers the 
construction of economic infrastructure, as in Japan. However, aid policy follows each 
president’s administrative vision, although the bureaucracy formulates its details8）.
4.3. Implementation agencies, NGOs, and private enterprises
In South Korea, aid implementation is assigned separately to KOICA and EDCF. A 
government-funded agency, KOICA is administered by the MOFAT, and it does not have 
direct involvement in the policymaking process. However, when MOFAT formulates ODA 
policy, it seeks opinions from KOICA and requests policy studies9）. KOICA’s opinions and 
policy studies can thus be absorbed into ODA policy. The Korea Eximbank implements the 
disbursement of loan aid through the EDCF. MOSF administers EDCF, and its Fund 
Management Council determines EDCF’s basic policy and operational plan (National Law 
Information Center 2016).
Outside the government, the growth of civil society since the late 1990s, including NGOs 
and volunteer organizations, especially during Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’s two 
progressive regimes, has boosted ODA volume (Lumsdaine and Schopf 2007). Moreover, the 
number of international cooperation NGOs has been increasing since 2005, encouraging the 
government to focus ODA on poverty reduction (Kim 2015: 13–15). However, South Korean 
NGOs have a shorter history than Western NGOs, and the South Korean government 
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distributed only 2% of bilateral aid through NGOs in 2011 (OECD 2013: 6). The government–
civil society ODA policy dialogue began in 2013, and has remained largely at the level of 
information sharing10）.
South Korea’s private enterprises have obtained opportunities to expand their business by 
winning bids for many EDCF and KOICA projects. In particular, EDCF’s implementation 
activity has depended on information provided by South Korean private, local enterprises, 
which have become involved in almost every process of EDCF projects, including requests, 
reviews, and project approvals (Kang 2005).
5. Analysis
Figures 1 and 2 display policymakers and stakeholders’ policy locations in Japan and 
South Korea, measured by the distance between their preference and poverty reduction and 
degree of involvement in ODA policymaking. In Japan, ODA policy has been formulated by 
the MOFA, MOF, and METI, whose policy preferences emphasize poverty reduction, financial 
stability, and economic interests, respectively, resulting in a plurality of ODA objectives. Since 
the Koizumi administration, the Cabinet’s preference—strategic interests—has come to 
influence the direction of Japan’s ODA policy and some aid projects. Japan’s ODA policy is 
formulated to cover all three ministries’ preferences and Cabinet, rather than being decided in 
the win-set where their indifference curves overlap.
In South Korea, on the other hand, the president and his foreign policy have determined 
ODA policy and performance. MOFAT and MOSF policy preferences form ODA policy in 
South Korea, but they cannot stray beyond the range of the president’s indifference curve. 
Aiming to improve ODA quality and effectiveness, the National Assembly and civil society 
(including NGOs) became more actively involved in the ODA policymaking process. However, 
their policy preferences’ impact on determining ODA policy is still limited.
This analysis proposes that Japan and South Korea’s ODA policymaking is explained by 
two categories: bureaucracy-led and president-led policymaking structures. In Japan, on the 
one hand, bureaucrats have decisive power in creating a policy within each bureau’s jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, in South Korea, the constitution confers greater authority on the president, 
and the bureaucracy has less autonomy to take actions contrary to the president’s will (Iio and 
Masuyama 2004). This analysis aligns with observations by other scholars such as Rix (1980), 
Katada (2002), and Kim (2013).
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However, the comparative analysis in this article also found that Japan and South Korea 
share substantial similarities in their approach to aid type and regional and sectoral priorities, 
and poverty reduction occupies only part of both donors’ overall ODA policy. These similarities 
resulted from the fact that presidents’ policies in South Korea encompassed a wide range of 
policy preferences including both poverty reduction and aggressive economic diplomacy. 
Broad presidential policy preferences in South Korea lessened the possibility of policy change 
concerning MDGs; as a result, the same policy outcomes emerged as in Japan. 
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Figure 2. Policymakers and stakeholdersʼ policy locations in South Korea
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These findings obtained from the analysis of policy makers’ preferences are remarkable 
because those explain similarities in the incorporation of poverty reduction into ODA policy in 
Japan and South Korea. The dichotomous approach, that is, applying an established policymaking 
model highlights differences in policy outcomes for Japan and South Korea’s cooperation in 
reducing global poverty because each policymaking model produces opposite results for policy 
flexibility (or stability). The president-led policymaking structure may result in more frequent 
policy changes owing to changes in government, whereas a bureaucracy-led policymaking 
structure can encourage continuity. Indeed, one main function of a bureaucracy-led system is 
to ensure a certain level of policy stability and prevent confusion due to frequent policy shifts 
accompanying changes of power. Furthermore, bureaucrats have a stake in a specific policy 
area and tend to protect their interests by securing budgets (Niskanen 1971). Lancaster (2010) 
highlighted this policy rigidity in Japan’s ODA, arguing that internal political issues, such as 
diversified interests, powerful bureaucracy, and divided organization, have constrained any 
policy change that might have enabled the convergence of Japan’s ODA with DAC poverty-
reduction norms. 
The analysis in this article shows that not only the policymaking system, but also the 
policymakers’ preferences are essential for a better understanding of the incorporation of 
poverty reduction into ODA policy in Japan and South Korea. In addition, not all ministries in 
a bureaucracy-led policymaking structure in Japan display policy rigidity. According to Hook 
and Zhang (1998), while METI focuses on Japan’s economic interests and seeks continuity in 
its policy discourse, MOFA emphasizes reform and transformation. Sometimes MOFA, which 
lacks domestic constituency, has used external force, especially pressure from the United 
States, to compete in bureaucratic politics and accomplish its own goals (Orr 1990).
6. Conclusion
This article compared ODA policymaking in Japan and South Korea and identified what 
conditions resulted in commonalities and differences in the incorporation of poverty reduction 
and the MDGs into ODA policy in Japan and South Korea, examining policymakers and 
stakeholders’ policy preferences in each donor country.
The analysis revealed that Japan and South Korea’s ODA is determined by reflecting 
bureaucratic organizations and presidents’ policy preferences, respectively. However, poverty 
reduction has remained only one of multiple overarching goals in both Japan and South Korea’s 
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ODA policy. This article’s analysis found that in South Korea, the presidents’ broad policy 
preferences lessened the possibility of policy change concerning MDGs; this resulted in the 
same policy outcomes emerging in Japan and South Korea. The findings are notable because 
the dichotomous approach applying an established policymaking model assumes that 
bureaucratic-led policymaking resulted in high policy stability and multiple aid objectives in 
Japan, whereas president-led policymaking allowed South Korea the flexibility to incorporate 
poverty reduction into its ODA policy.
Finally, this article’s argument is that not only the policymaking system—i.e., who decides 
ODA policy—but also the policymakers’ preferences are essential for a better understanding 
of the commonalities and differences between Japan and South Korea’s ODA. In recent years, 
involvement in the ODA policymaking of Japan’s Cabinet and South Korea’s National Assembly 
has been rising. To compare the two donors’ overall ODA policies as new players emerge, we 
would need further study of their policy preferences.
Notes
1） I use the current name and common abbreviation for each ministry, except that I use MOFAT 
instead of MOFA for Korea’s foreign affairs agency to distinguish it from MOFA of Japan.
2） Paper interview with an METI official on July 10, 2008.
3） Author’s interview with an ex-JBIC official in Tokyo on October 24, 2008.
4） Author’s interview with ex-JBIC official in Tokyo on October 24, 2008.
5） Paper interview with a METI official on July 10, 2008.
6） Author’s interview with a National Assembly official in Seoul on February 13, 2014.
7） Author’s interview with a National Assembly official in Seoul on February 13, 2014.
8） Author’s interview with a National Assembly official in Seoul on February 13, 2014.
9） Author’s interview with KOICA officials in Seongnam-si on February 17, 2014.
10） Author’s interview with an NGO official in Seoul on February 7, 2014.
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